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THE AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION OF A LABOR ARBITRATOR
TO MODIFY OR ELIMINATE A PROVISION OF A COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT BECAUSE IN HIS OPINION
IT VIOLATES FEDERAL LAW
The obligation of a labor arbitrator to entertain statutory issues arising
from a dispute over a collective bargaining agreement has recently been
the subject of much controversy among those traditional mediators them-
selves, the labor arbitrators. To say that this controversy has not yet been
resolved would be an understatement. This paper will attempt to set forth
the positions advocated at the recent meetings of the National Academy of
Arbitrators and to make a few suggestions that will hopefully shed some
additional light on the controversy.
Several members of the Academy have supported the "orthodox" theory
that the arbitrator's role is that of official reader and anything beyond that
is beyond the scope of his responsibility and competence.' At the other
extreme is the "liberal" theory that the arbitrator's responsibility is to ter-
minate the controversy and that includes the solution of legal issues.' There
are still other members of the Academy who would prefer a position be-
tween the two extremes and would allow an arbitrator to resolve legal is-
sues on certain occasions.3
The resolution of controversies arising from collective agreements in-
volves a unique tripartite system of adjudication. As is the case with most
other disputes, many labor disputes will ultimately have to be resolved by
the courts. Where certain charges of unfair labor practice are involved,
Congress has granted the National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction.4
1 Meltzer, "Ruminations About Ideology, Law, And Labor Arbitration," The Arbitrator, The
NLRB, And The Courts, Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Meeting, Nat'l. Academy of
Arbitrators, (Washington: BNA Books, 1967) 1 [hereinafter cited as 1967 Meltzer Paper];
Meltzer, 'The Role of Law in Arbitration: A Rejoinder," Developments in American and For-
eign Arbitration, Proceedings of the Twenty-first Annual Meeting, Nat'l. Academy of Arbitra-
tors, (Washington: BNA Books, 1968) 58; St Antoine, "The Role of Law in Arbitration: Dis-
cussion," Developments in American and Foreign Arbitration, Proceedings of the Twenty-first
Annual Meeting, Nat'l. Academy of Arbitrators, (Washington: BNA Books, 1968) 75.
2 Howlett, "The Arbitrator, The NLRB, and The Courts," The Arbitrator, The NLRB, and
The Courts, Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Meeting, Nat'l. Academy of Arbitrators,
(Washington: BNA Books, 1967) 67 [hereinafter cited as 1967 Howlett paper]; Howlett, "The
Role of Law in Arbitration: A Reprise," Developments i-n American and Foreign Arbitration,
Proceedings of the Twenty-first Annual Meeting, Nat'l. Academy of Arbitrators, (Washington:
BNA Books, 1968) 64 [hereinafter cited as 1968 Howlett paper].
3 Cox, "Ihe Place of Law in Labor Arbitration," The Profession of Labor Arbitration, Selected
Papers from the First Seven Annual Meetings of the Nat'l. Academy of Arbitrators, 1948-1954,
(Washington: BNA Books, 1957) 76; Mittenthal, "The Role of Law in Arbitration," Develop-
ments in American and Foreign Arbitration, Proceedings of the Twenty-first Annual Meeting,
Nat'L. Academy of Arbitrators, (Washington: BNA Books, 1968) 42; Sovern, "When Should
Arbitrators Follow Federal Law," Arbitration and the Expanding Role of Neutrals, Proceedings
of the Twenty-third Annual Meeting, Nat'l. Academy of Arbitrators, (Washington: BNA
Books, 1970) 29.
4 Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1947).
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In addition, to provide an even swifter method of reconciliation, many col-
lective bargaining agreements have provided for private settlement
through arbitration. 5 Both the courts6 and the NLRB have expressed
policies favoring the private resolution of labor disputes.
The debate over the application of federal law by the arbitrator does
not concern itself with those situations in which it is necessary for the arbi-
trator to examine the law in order to interpret a provision of the contract.
For example, many agreements provide for dismissal of an employee for
"just cause." Under such a provision if the employer decided to dismiss an
employee for distributing union leaflets in the company parking lot, the
sensible arbitrator would have to examine the NLRB's decisions in order
to determine if "just cause" can be found." The controversy also does not
concern itself with those situations in which the parties have specifically
asked the arbitrator to decide the statutory issue. The advocates of both
the liberal and orthodox positions agree that the arbitrator may then rest
his decision on the statute
The crux of the controversy is, what is the authority and obligation of
a labor arbitrator to modify or eliminate a provision of a collective bar-
gaining agreement because in his opinion its unaltered application would
violate federal law?
The papers presented to the various annual meetings of the Academy
have not resolved this issue. However, it is dear that the intent of all the
advocates is to ensure that the parties to labor controversies will receive the
best services that the arbitrator can provide. Certainly one goal that must
be considered is that of providing a just resolution of the controversy with
a minimum of litigation.
In an effort to elicit further information to help resolve this debate, a
questionnaire was mailed to two hundred randomly selected members of
the Academy. Of those members solicited, seventy-nine members com-
pleted and returned the questionnaire; and three members returned letters
on the general topic. The results of this questionnaire demonstrated that,
in total, there is almost a fifty-fifty division between the supporters of the
"orthodox" and the "liberal" theories. However, particular questions dem-
onstrate greater or lesser degrees of support for one or more of the various
components of the theories. The essence of these questions and their re-
sults will be set out at various points in the paper in connection with the
5 M. BERNSTEIN, PRIVATE DISPUTE SETrLEMENT 269 (1968).
6 United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United. Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
7 Spielberg Manufacturing Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080,36 LR.R.M. 1152 (1955).
8 Sovern, supra note 3, at 30.
9Id.
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particular opinions examined. The full text of the questions posed and the
complete response received will then be set out in a corresponding footnote.
THE ORTHODOX POSITION
Professor Bernard Meltzer is the leading exponent of the orthodox
view. Essentially, his position is that the function of a labor arbitrator is
to decide what the parties intended when they entered into the collective
bargaining agreement. If this intention is contrary to some higher law,
then it is the responsibility of one of the parties to take the case before an
appropriate forum and let the legal decision be made there.10 Meltzer
stated, "Where . . .there is an irrepressible conflict, the arbitrator, in my
opinion, should respect the agreement and ignore the law."'1  Meltzer's
position may be summarized by the following quotation:
Arbitrators should ...respect ...the agreement that is the source of
their authority and should leave to the courts or other official tribunals the
determination of whether the agreement contravenes a higher law. Other-
wise, arbitrators would be deciding issues that go beyond not only the sub-
mission agreement but also arbitral competence.' 2
Under this theory, if the parties request that the arbitrator issue an ad-
ditional advisory opinion on the legal issue involved,"3 or if they intended
to incorporate legal standards into their agreement,14 Meltzer would deem
the arbitrator justified in resolving the legal questions involved. In fact,
the professor would even go one step further and direct the arbitrator to
look to the applicable law for guidance in order to avoid construing an
ambiguous provision in an illegal manner. " If we accept Meltzer's pre-
vious assertion that arbitrators are generally not competent to cope with
problems of statutory interpretation, then it seems difficult to accept the
permissiveness of Meltzer's latter assertions.
In the absence of explicit language, it is difficult to factually determine
the exact intent of various companies and unions entering into a collective
bargaining agreement. It is, therefore, difficult to determine the extent
to which the parties have consented to have the arbitrator resolve their
disputes. However, Mr. Meltzer's second point, that individual labor arbi-
trators may not possess the necessary qualifications to decide the broad
range of legal questions that may surface in a given dispute, seems more sus-
ceptible to a factual determination: Certainly not all arbitrators have law
degrees. In fact, those who are lawyers may or may not possess special
10 1967 Mfeltzer paper 16.
11Id.
12 Id. at 17.
13id. at 31.
14 Id. at 15.
15 Id.
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talents in the specific areas of law involved. This point receives some
support from the results of the questionnaire. That survey indicated that
82 percent of the members responding would characterize themselves as
being either (1) competent and expert, or (2) competent, in deciding a
question involving the National Labor Relations Act or Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act. However, only 56 percent of the respondents would
feel that positive if the question involved the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosing Act, and only 36 percent would be that positive if the legal
issue involved any of the federal antitrust statutes.' 6
Professor Meltzer is certainly not without support for his position. The
idea that the arbitrator should respect the agreement and ignore the law
draws support from the statement of Mr. Justice Douglas in United Steel-
workers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp. wherein he stated,
"[the awardl may be read as based solely upon the arbitrator's view of
the requirements of enacted legislation, which would mean that he ex-
ceeded the scope of the submission."' 7 This theory was also supported by
Professor Theodore St. Antoine during a discussion period at the 1968
16 The following is the actual question presented to the members of the Academy and its
results:
Assuming you were authorized to do so, how would you feel about interpreting the pro-
visions of a collective-agreement in accordance with the following statutes. (1) Would
feel competent and expert; (2) Would feel competent, (3) Would rather avoid; (4)
No opinion.
(1)
National Labor Relations Act ---------- 48%
Labor Management Relations Act -------- 48%
Railway Labor Act ------------------ 24%
federal antitrust statutes --------------- 12%
Norris-La Guardia ------------------- 31%
Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act ------------------- 29%
Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act -------------------- 15%
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Tide VII ------ 18%
Fair Labor Standards Act ------------- 25%
Executive Order No. 10988 Employee-Management
Cooperation in the Federal Service ____ 31%
The following were the results of those respondents
also lawyers (Note: these results were also included in
(1)
National Labor Relations Act ----------- 65 %
Labor Management Relations Act -------- 65 %
Railway Labor Act ------------------ 34%
federal antitrust statutes --------------- 16%
Norris-La Guardia ------------------ 43%
Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act -------------------- 39%
Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act -------------------- 23%
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII ------ 23%
Fair Labor Standards Act ------------- 37%
Executive Order No. 10988 Employee-Management
Cooperation in the Federal Service --- 39%
'7 363 U.S. at 597.
(3)
16%
16%
32%
57%
29%
43% 26% 2%
41% 40% 4%
47% 31% 4%
45% 26% 4%
44% 19% 6%
who indicated that they were
the total results set out above):
(2) (3) (4)
25% 7% 3%
25% 7% 3%
50% 13% 3%
30% 42% 12%
43% 9% 5%
44% 12% 5%
53% 16% 8%
58% 13% 6%
39% 16% 8%
9% 8%
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meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators. 8 St. Antoine's view is,
"The Arbitrator is simply the 'official reader' designated by the parties to
provide definitive interpretations of their agreement."' 1
Under the orthodox theory the arbitrator is not believed to have either
the power of the obligation to modify or eliminate a provision of a col-
lective bargaining agreement on the grounds that it conflicts with a statu-
tory command. Therefore, the disciples of this theory find it unnecessary
to reach the question of whether such activity would tend to curtail litiga-
tion.
There are several arbitration decisions that support the orthodox posi-
tion.20 In Rowland Tompkins and Sons, the arbitrator stated, "I may only
decide whether the agreement as written has been breached, not whether
the agreement as written breaches or violates any law."'" The arbitrator
in C. Finkbeiner, Inc. stated that the only situation in which an arbitrator
would have the authority to determine legal questions involved in the is-
sue submitted for arbitration is where the authority is, "dearly and un-
equivocally," granted.
22
MIDDLE GROUND POSITIONS
In keeping with the art of compromise that these professionals strive to
practice, several leaders have proposed the adoption of middle ground the-
ories. The first to advocate such a position was Professor Cox in a paper
presented to the National Academy of Arbitrators in 1952.23 His position
is that the arbitrator should look to the statutes so as to avoid issuing an
award that would require a violation of public law or policy2 4 Cox, how-
ever, warned that:
The suggested principle includes important limitations. It does not
suggest that an arbitrator should pass upon all the parties legal rights and
obligations. It does not suggest that an arbitrator should refuse to give
effect to a contract provision merely because the courts would not enforce
it. Nor does it imply that an arbitrator should be guided by judge-made
rules of evidence or contract interpretation. The principle requires only
that the arbitrator look to see whether sustaining the grievance would re-
quire conduct the law forbids or would enforce an illegal contract; if so,
the arbitrator should not sustain the grievance.
If this occasionally requires lay arbitrators to rule upon difficult legal
18 St Antoine, supra note 1 at 77.
19 Id.
2 0 Butler Manufacturing Co., 68-1 ARB (CCH). 5 8263 (1968); International Paper Co.,
67-2 ARB (CCH). 5 8589 (1967); Savoy Laundry and Linen Supply, Inc., 48 Lab. Arb. 760
(1967).
21 Rowland Tompkins and Sons, 35 Lab. Arb. 154, 156 (1960).
22 C. Finkbeiner, Inc, 44 Lab. Arb. 1109, 1114 (1965).
23 Cox, supra note 3.
24 Id. at 78.
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questions, they may comfort themselves with the knowledge that to err is
human--even in the legal professions 25
This position was supported by Mr. Richard Mittenthal in an address
before the Academy in 1968.26 Mr. Mittenthal then embroidered upon
the Cox position by urging that while an arbitrator's award may permit
conduct forbidden by law but sanctioned by contract, it should not require
conduct forbidden by law even though sanctioned by contract."
Cox cites as an example a situation that occurred shortly after World
War II in which the Selective Service Act was found to conflict with pro-
visions in many collective bargaining agreements. The Act required com-
panies to grant a preference to returning veterans over nonveterans in the
event of layoffs. Most contract provisions provided that the returning veter-
ans would only have the same senority they would have had if they had
not been drafted. If an employer then laid off a nonveteran with senority
over a veteran and the nonveteran filed a grievance claiming that the con-
tract had been violated, the arbitrator would be forced to deny the griev-
ance. His reason being that had the arbitrator ordered the nonveteran
reinstated at the expense of the veteran, the arbitrator would have been
ordering the company to do an illegal act.2"
A question was submitted in the survey in an effort to ascertain the
support among members of the Academy for this position. The results in-
dicated 42 percent in favor of the Cox-Mittenthal position, 40 percent op-
posed, and 18 percent had no opinion. Thus a clear conclusion from
that tabulation is difficult.29
It should be noted that the Cox-Mittenthal position does not concern
itself with the question of the arbitrator's competence. In view of the ques-
tionnaire's results, as set out in connection with the comments on Profes-
251d. at 79.
2 Mittenthal, supra note 3.
2id. at 50.
28 Cox, supra note 3 at 77; see E. G. Dow Chemical Co., I Lab. Arb. 70 (1945).
29 Ile following is the actual question presented to the members of the Academy and its
results:
Do you agree with the following position? The arbitrator's award may permit
conduct forbidden by law but sanctioned by contract, however it should not require
conduct forbidden by law even though sanctioned by contract.
The following is an example of agreement with the above position: Congress passes
a statute giving returning war veterans a preference over nonveterans in the event of
layoffs. The management and the union have previously entered into a collective bar-
gaining agreement with a provision providing that returning veterans shall have only
the seniority they would have had if they had not been drafted. Management then
retains a veteran and lays off a nonveteran with more seniority. The nonveteran
grieves under the agreement. The arbitrator should deny the grievance because a re-
instatement award, if it displaced the veteran, would require the employer to engage in
conduct forbidden by law. If, on the other hand, the veteran had been laid off, the
arbitrator would have been forced to also deny his grievance this time because his
award would be merely permitting conduct forbidden by law, not requiring it.
Yes (42%) No (40%) No Opinion (18%)
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sor Meltzer's opinion, demonstrating the diversity of expertise among the
Academy's members, Meltzer's competence point should not be overlooked.
Professor Cox is also of the opinion that the decision to entertain the
legal question should be in part determined by the scope of the authority
granted to the arbitrator.30 If the arbitrator's scope of authority is broad,
Cox feels that the arbitrator would be shirking his duties were he to avoid
the legal question.3' When a question concerning this theory was set forth
in the survey, an almost even diversity of opinion was shown. Of those
responding, 45 percent favored this position, while 44 percent were op-
posed, and 11 percent expressed no opinion. It should be noted, though,
that the example of a broad scope of an arbitrator's authority used in the
questionnaire was not as all-encompassing as the example Cox used."2
At the 1970 meeting of the Academy, Dean Michael Sovern also at-
tempted to occupy the middle ground.33  He began by meeting Meltzer's
argument that arbitrators lacked the necessary competence to decide statu-
tory issues. Sovern argued that while some arbitrators may not be qualified
to decide particular statutory issues, others would be. 4 He further argued
that if Professor Meltzer believes arbitrators are sufficiently competent to
be guided by statutes so as to avoid construing an ambiguous provision in
an illegal manner, then they ought to be competent enough to decide the
issue openly. 5 Dean Sovern then listed four guidelines that he felt should
be satisfied before an arbitrator entertains a legal issue:
1. The arbitrator is qualified.
2. The question of law is implicated in a dispute over the applica-
tion or interpretation of a contract that is also before him.
3. The question of law is raised by a contention that, if the conduct
complained of does violate the contract, the law nevertheless immunizes
or even requires it.
4. The courts lack primary jurisdiction to adjudicate the question of
law.30
30 Cox, supra note 3 at 81.
31 Id. at 82.
3 2 The following is the actual question submitted to the members of the Academy and its
results:
Would you be more inclined to entertain the question of the applicability of federal
law if the scope of the arbitrator's authority were broad rather than narrow? An ex-
ample of a broad scope of authority being one in which the agreeement states that any
dispute between the parties arising under the agreement may be submitted to arbitra-
tion. A narrow scope of authority being one which limits arbitration to disputes in-
volving the interpretation and application of specific terms of the agreement (as-
suming the question involved is one of those specific terms).
Yes (45%) No (44%) No Opinion (11%)
33 Sovern, supra note 3.
341d. at 35.
35 Id.
aO Id. at 38.
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Sovern's first two conditions would appear eminently sensible to any-
one contemplating the problem. If the arbitrator lacks the ability to in-
terpret the statute and has no one to look to for assistance, there would
be little to be gained by his attempt. If the legal question does not arise
from the determination of an issue involved in a collective bargaining
agreement dispute, a labor arbitrator would have no business deciding it.
Such questions would be much more appropriate for resolution elsewhere.
It is the third and fourth criteria that are the most controversial. It is
Sovern's opinion that since a controversy arising from a collective bargain-
ing agreement may force the parties into battle in three separate arenas
(i.e., courts, NLRB, and arbitration), the arbitrator should come forth and
attempt to terminate the dispute. If the arbitrator does not at least try to
end the dispute, Sovern foresees mass confusion, long delays, and exorbi-
tant expenses.37 He cites as an appropriate situation a controversy between
a company and a union over a union security clause. In such a situation,
the union might demand the dismissal of an employee for failure to join
the union. The company might then contend that while the provision
does not require dismissal, even if it did, such action would be illegal under
the National Labor Relations Act. This theory would then permit a com-
plete resolution of the disagreement by a qualified arbitrator because the
four guidelines are satisfied. One, the arbitrator is qualified. Two, the
dispute arises from a contract interpretation controversy. Three, the com-
pany is claiming that even if the agreement requires dismissal, the N.L.R.A.
nevertheless requires the company to retain the employee. Four, this is not
a case where the federal courts have primary jurisdiction. Certainly, if
the ultimate question is how may the arbitrator best serve the parties, this
theory must be considered a step in the right direction.
The arbitration cases have demonstrated still other middle ground the-
ories. In Penick and Ford, Ltd.,as the arbitrator stated that statutory law
should be applied when it is clear, but if the NLRB or the courts have
not yet had an opportunity to crystallize their legal theories, the arbitrator
should abstain from entertaining the legal questions. The Connecticut
State Board of Mediation held in The Ingraham Co. 9 that where the agree-
ments provisions are patently and unambiguously in violation of law,
the arbitrator should recognize this fact and refuse to enforce an illegal
contract. However, the Connecticut Board felt the arbitrator should make
certain that the violation is unmistakable and that he is not substituting
himself for the authority and expertise of the recognized statutory forum.
40
371,d. at 38, 39.
38 Penick and Ford, Ltd., 62-2 ARB (CCH). § 8669 (1962).
39 The Ingraham Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 884 (1966).
40 Id. at 889.
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THE LIBERAL POSITION
At the other extreme from Professor Meltzer's position is the position
taken by Mr. Robert Howlett at the 1967 and 1968 meetings of the Acad-
emy.41 It is his opinion that the arbitrator has a responsibility to entertain
relevant statutory questions. 2 He stated, "Arbitrators should render deci-
sions on the issues before them based on both contract language and law."'4.
Mr. Howlett relies heavily for the justification of his theory upon the
policies announced by the National Labor Relations Board in the Spiel-
berg case.4 This case involved the dismissal of four employees for their
activities during a strike. The arbitrator upheld the dismissal and the
NLRB upheld the arbitrator stating that while the NLRB undoubtedly is
not bound by the award of an arbitrator,45 it will withhold its authority
to decide charges of unfair labor practice where the proceedings appear to
have been conducted in a fair and regular manner and the arbitrator's de-
cision does not appear to be clearly repugnant to the policies and purposes
of the act.4" Howlett interprets the Spielberg test as being essentially due
process.47
In 1962 the Board reaffirmed and extended the Spielberg doctrine in
International Harvestor Co.4 ' The resolution of the legal issue by the
arbitrator was found to be not contrary to settled law and, therefore, not
clearly repugnant to the Act. The Board stated,
Nor do we find, as the Trial Examiner did, that the resolution of the legal
issue before him was at variance with settled law and therefore dearly re-
pugnant to the purposes of the Act.... However, we need not decide
these questions in determining to accept the arbitrator's award since it
plainly appears to us that the ward is not palpably wrong. To require
more of the Board would mean substituting the Board's judgment for that
of the arbitrator, thereby defeating the purposes of the Act....49
The Board upheld the Spielberg doctrine stating it would accept an arbi-
trator's award, "[U]nless it dearly appears that the arbitration proceedings
were tainted by fraud, collusion, unfairness, or serious procedural irregular-
ities or that the award was dearly repugnant to the purposes and policies
of the Act."50  Spielberg and International Harvestor leave little doubt
411967 Howlett paper, 1968 Howlett paper.
421967 Howlett paper 78-79.
431d. at 83.
44Id. at 79; Spielberg Manufacturing Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 LR.R.M. 1152 (1955).
45 See N.L.R.B. v. Walt Disney Productions, 146 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 877 (1945).
46 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
47 1967 Howlett paper at 79.
48 International Harvestor Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 51 L.R.R.M. 1155 (1962), aff'd., Ramsey
v. N.L.R.B., 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
40 138 N.L.R.B. at 928, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1157.
GO 138 N.L.R.B. at 927, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1157. For cases in which the Board has been un-
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that National Labor Relations Board policy definitely favors arbitral deter-
mination of legal issues.
Howlett further suggests that his theory gains support from the notion
that every contract includes all applicable law. 1 Mittenthal relies on
Williston52 and Corbin5" to strongly and justifiably criticize this point as
being highly artificial since it implies that everybody knows the law . 4
Under Howlett's liberal theory, the arbitrator is not only under a duty
to apply substantive law but is also under a duty to probe for a statutory
violation.55 He considers this necessary if the Board is to be able to fully
exercise its policy of deferring to the arbitral decision. Howlett also points
out that since the statute of limitations on unfair labor practices is only six
months,56 an injustice might result if the arbitrator fails to probe for a
statutory violation.5 7
There are many arbitration cases supporting the liberal theory." The
Arbitrator in Montgomery Ward and Company5" stated, [I]t is the pres-
ent policy of the National Labor Relations Board to encourage and sup-
port intelligent arbitration as one of the presently indispensable methods
of settling the great volume of labor disputes which arise in our time.""0
Hawthorn-Mellody, Inc. 1 held that the National Labor Relations Act
must be looked to for guidance in the determination of the applicability of
a collective agreement provision stating that it would be "wholly unrea-
sonable" to ignore both it and other legal obligations. 2
FURTHER SUGGESTIONS
In an effort to determine the most appropriate future course for labor
arbitrators to take, it may be helpful to disregard the individual question
of whether or not an arbitrator should entertain legal issues and to view
able to defer to the arbitrators award because he failed to resolve the legal issue, see Raytheon
Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 52 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1963); Monsanto Chemical Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1097,
47 L.R.R.M. 1451 (1961); I. Oscherwitz and Sons, 130 N.L.R.B. 1078, 47 L.R.R.M. 1415
(1961).
511967 Howlett paper at 83.
52 S. WLLiSTON, CoNrRAcrs, § 615 (rev. ed., 1961).
5 3A. CORBIN, CONTRAcrs, § 551 (rev. ed., 1960).
5 4 Mittenthal, supra note 3 at 44; But see Van Huffman v. Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535,
550 (1866); Adams v. Spillards, 187 Ark. 641,61 S.W.2d 686 (1933).
51967 Howlett Paper at 92.
56 Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1947).
571967 Howlett paper at 92.
5 8 Clark Equipment Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 39 (1967); Alsco, Inc., 48 Lab. Arb. 1244 (1967);
Pennsylvania Electric Co., 47 Lab. Arb. 526 (1967); Coakley Brothers Co., 47 ab. Arb. 356
(1966); General American Transportation Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 1308 (1964); Hancock Steel Co.,
Inc., 23 Lab. Arb. 44 (1954).
59 Montgomery Ward and Company, 49 Lab. Arb. 271 (1967).
60 Id. at 274.
61 Hawthorn-Mellody, Inc., 42 Lab. Arb. 1296 (1964).
62 Id. at 1299.
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the question as part of an overall problem of how may the arbitrator best
serve his employers. One manner in which the arbitrator may be of ser-
vice to the parties is to aid in limiting the length of litigation necessary to
resolve the controversy. Certainly most would agree that one reason for
arbitration's popularity is the likelihood of it resulting in a speedy resolu-
tion of day to day industrial disputes. Where controversies are prolonged,
both parties feel the pain of lowered production and efficiency.
One of the questions put to the members of the Academy in the survey
attempted to ascertain the members' opinions as to whether the entertaining
of the legal question by an arbitrator would tend to limit the length of
litigation between the parties. A clear majority of those answering the
question felt this would limit the length of litigation."s
There would be little hope of curtailing the length of litigation between
the parties if those arbitrators called upon to rule on the legal questions
were incompetent to do so. But the realities of the system must be con-
sidered and, as a practical matter, the legal issues likely to arise from a col-
lective agreement are limited. As Dean Sovern points out, an arbitrator
would have no business entertaining legal questions that did not arise in
a dispute over a collective bargaining agreement." It seems likely that
many legal issues arising from disputes over collective agreements would
involve interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act or the Labor
Management Relations Act. It should be recalled that these are the stat-
utes that 82 percent of the arbitrators returning the questionnaire felt
either (1) competent and expert, or (2) competent to apply. In fact,
among lawyer-arbitrators, 90 percent would consider themselves to possess
at least that degree of competence. The percentage of respondents, both
lawyer and nonlawyer, considering themselves as having at least that
amount of competence for certain other statutes likely to arise from a dis-
pute over a collective bargaining agreement is set out below. The figure
in parenthesis represents the percentage of lawyer-arbitrators who regard
themselves as possessing at least that degree of expertise.65
Railway Labor Act ------------------------ 65% (84%)
federal antitrust statutes --------------------- 36% (46%)
Norris-La Guardia ------------------------ 68% (86%)
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act --- 72% (83%)
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act -------- 56% (86%)
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII --------------- 65% (81%)
63 The following is the actual question submitted to the members of the Academy and its
results:
Do you feel that the interpretation of the legal question involved in a dispute over a
collective bargaining agreement by the arbitrator would generally tend to limit the
length of litigation between the parties?
Yes (60%) No (14%) No Opinion (26%)
64 Sovern, supra note 3 at 38.
05 Footnote 17, supra.
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Fair Labor Standards Act ------------------- 70% (76%)
Executive Order No. 10988 Employee-Management
Cooperation in the Federal Service ------------ 75% (83%)
Therefore, with the exception of the federal antitrust statutes, it is obvious
that a clear majority of the respondents consider themselves at least com-
petent to entertain legal questions based on the above statutes. In addi-
tion, it seems likely that controversies involving the above statutes would
constitute a large percentage of the legal questions arising from collective
agreements. It is therefore submitted that today's labor arbitrator does
possess the necessary expertise to resolve statutory issues in a large majority
of the potential cases.
By stating that the arbitrator will be sufficiently competent to entertain
the legal issue in a large majority of the potential cases, it is implicit that
there will be some cases in which the individual arbitrator will not con-
sider himself qualified to resolve the statutory issue. In that situation, the
arbitrator may still be able to completely resolve his employers' controversy
by procuring technical assistance from an expert in the particular field of
law. The technical specialist could then provide the arbitrator with the
help he needs to decide the legal issue. While this suggestion has not been
widely used, the right of an arbitrator to procure assistance from a technical
specialist has long been recognized. This privilege has been traditionally
limited to assistance in the areas of technical specialities, but there is no
reason legal advice could not be obtained in the same manner. This would
not be in derogation of the arbitrator's authority since all responsibility
would still rest with him, he would merely be calling upon the aid of a
practitioner in a highly technical field to assist him in his decision in but
one area of the controversy.
Certainly this suggestion does raise some questions. Such a procedure
would increase the expense of arbitration. However, if it results in cur-
tailing the length of litigation between the parties, the extra expense may
serve as the basis for substantial savings in the long run. It may also be
difficult to find a labor law expert who has not previously aligned himself
with either labor or management. However, there is no reason why an
arbitrator in search of specialized assistance should limit himself to the
field of practicing labor lawyers. Several academics are labor law experts.
In addition, an arbitrator might even call upon a fellow member of the
Academy for assistance. In that case the parties would still have the bene-
fit of the impartiality of the arbitrator they have selected because the addi-
tional member of the Academy would merely be serving in an advisory
capacity with all final decisions resting upon that person selected by the
parties. After considering the problems posed by such a suggestion, it is
submitted that the problems raised are not significant and the advantages
to be gained under such a procedure, such as limiting the length of liti-
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gation, greatly outweigh the disadvantages. This theory would permit
any arbitrator to resolve any legal dispute implicit in the interpretation
of a collective bargaining agreement because any absence of qualifications
in the particular arbitrator would be compensated by the expertise of the
technical specialist. Therefore, there would be no need to limit the arbi-
trator's authority to controversies involving a few well-known labor sta-
tutes.
With the increased use of technical specialists there would be no more
reason for a nonlawyer arbitrator to avoid statutory issues than there would
be for him to avoid an engineering question or any other technical issue.
The use of advisory specialists would enable the professional arbitrator to
gather together all of the necesssary expertise to provide his employers with
a just resolution of their dispute. This is consistent with the opinions ex-
pressed in response to the survey. The results of the questionnaire showed
that 78 percent of the members responding felt that if any arbitrators were
given the authority to entertain questions of federal law, it should not be
limited to lawyer-arbitrators. Even among those members of the Academy
who indicated that they were also lawyers, 71 percent favored permitting
nonlawyer arbitrators to entertain legal questions. 8 This is also consistent
with the idea previously expressed that most labor arbitrators even without
the aid of technical specialists possess sufficient expertise to cope with the
majority of legal issues likely to arise from a dispute over a collective bar-
gaining agreement.
A minimum of research in the labor arbitration field will quickly demon-
strate that the members of the National Academy of Arbitrators are dedi-
cated professionals who are experts in the labor field. As experts, they
are far more qualified to interpret labor statutes than are most judges.
Whether or not they individually possess expertise on legal issues outside
the scope of their speciality is normally unimportant because the type of
legal problem that may arise from a collective agreement is limited and,
therefore, there would normally be no need for any additional expertise.
In addition, the parties normally have the opportunity to select an arbi-
trator sufficiently competent to resolve the legal controversy. The ques-
tionnaire demonstrated that of those arbitrators involved in cases in which
a legal issue was present, 77 percent were selected ad hoc. 7  This demon-
0 The following is the question submitted to the members of the Academy and its results:
Assume that there are appropriate circumstances for a labor arbitrator to decide whether
a federal law requires an arbitrator to modify or eliminate a provision of a collective
bargaining agreement. Do you think that this power should be limited to lawyer-
arbitrators?
Yes (14%) No (78%) No Opinion (8%)
The tabulation is this question was further broken down to include in the subject group only
those members of the Academy who indicated that they were lawyers. (Note: The above tabu-
lation includes the entire subject group including both lawyers and nonlawyers.)
Yes (18%) No (71%) No Opinion (11%)
07 The following is the question submitted to the members of the Academy and its results:
1971]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
strates that the parties do normally have an opportunity to select a particu-
lar arbitrator to resolve a particular dispute. Therefore, they could select
an arbitrator competent in the particular legal area controverted. How-
ever, there is one caveat: The parties may not always take advantage of
this opportunity. They may be more concerned with selecting an arbitra-
tor on the basis of his impartiality, or lack of it.
Some arbitrators, who essentially are expounding middle ground the-
ories, feel that an arbitrator may apply the law to modify or eliminate a
provision of a collective bargaining agreement only if the law is clear.",
Such a notion has the effect of crippling the authority of the arbitrator to
apply pertinent law. If the law is dear to the arbitrator, it is probably
also clear to the parties; and it would not normally be prudent for a party
to controvert an issue he knows he will lose.
Such a notion completely fails to take account of the expertise of the
labor arbitrator and fails to concern itself with the goal of curtailing liti-
gation. Even in the hypothetical case in which new labor legislation is
just enacted and the first controversy involving this legislation is presented
to an arbitrator, there may still be advantages in permitting the arbitrator
to entertain the legal question. If, in fact, this arbitrator is a labor expert,
his opinion on the new statute may be very helpful to the members of
the NLRB or the courts who will eventually have to resolve the issue. In
fact, the Spielberg doctrine merely asks that the arbitral award be not re-
pugnant to the statute. Under that theory there is even a good chance that
the goal of curtailing litigation will be furthered since the award of an
experienced arbitrator is not likely to be repugnant to even a new statute.
In any event, there are advantages to be found when the arbitrator decides
to entertain the legal issue even in the absence of clear statutory guid-
ance.
CONCLUSION
There are many conflicting theories as to what the role of the labor
arbitrator should be when one of the parties to a dispute over a collective
bargaining agreement contends that the application of a provision would
be contrary to federal law. The supporters of the orthodox view contend
that the arbitrator should be content to be the official reader of the agree-
ment. Recently there has been a movement among some members of the
National Academy of Arbitrators to encourage their fellow members to
attempt to resolve the entire controversy including any statutory issues
involved. The latter view appears to be most consistent with the concept
Have you ever been involved in a case where a provision of the collective bargaining
agreement was alleged to violate federal law? If you were involved in such a case, how
were you selected as arbitrator?
Permanent Arbitrator (23%) Selected ad hoc (77%) Other (0)
68 Penick and Ford, Ltd., 62-2 ARB (CCH). § 8669 (1962).
[Vol. 32
1971] NOTES 409
of providing arbitration as a swift means of settling industrial controversy.
It is submitted that labor arbitrators are either competent to handle the stat-
utory questions that may arise from a collective bargaining agreement or
that the arbitrator is capable of obtaining the necessary legal advice
through the use of a technical assistant. Hopefully, the members of the
Academy will accept the responsibility of their expertise.
The last few annual meetings of the National Academy of Arbitrators
have elicited several well considered opinions on this subject from some
of the most distinguished members of the profession. Their papers have
provided the expert testimony necessary to resolve this controversy. Hope-
fully, the humble questionnaire set forth in this article will help begin the
second phase of gathering the necessary emperical data. Certainly if future
attempts to gather data encounter as thoughtful responses as did this sur-
vey, the debate will soon be resolved.
James Young
